THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT AND THE FATAL INJURY:
DOES AN OFFER TO SELL AN INFRINGING PRODUCT
GiVE RISE TO A DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER A CGL?
WILLARD L. HEMSWORTH

III

Abstract
Case law in the area of patent infringement has held that patent
infringement cannot occur in the course of an insured's advertising
activities as a matter of law. In 1996, the United States added "offer to
sell" as one of the enumerated offenses of direct patent infringement to
35 U.S.C. §271(a). Since that time, there has been little deviation or
fluctuation from the above mentioned principle, especially in litigation
where a patentee's search for insurance coverage from their CGL
policies "Adverting Injury" provision. This Comment discusses the
necessity of the court system to reexamine the modification to 35
U.S.C. §271(a), specifically, the impact of the addition of "offer to sell"
as an enumerated offense of patent infringement. Additionally, this
Comment proposes that courts should acknowledge that when offering
for sale a potentially infringing device is the act of patent
infringement, alleged infringers should be entitled to secure financial
assistance from their CGL policy issuers for the costs associated with
the duty to defend their infringement claims.
Copyright © 2002 The John Marshall Law School
Cite as 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 344

THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT AND THE FATAL INJURY:
DOES AN OFFER TO SELL AN INFRINGING PRODUCT
GIVE RISE TO A DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER A CGL?
WILLARD L. HEMSWORTH III*

INTRODUCTION
Imagine Ernie Entrepreneur pursuing the American dream of economic freedom
and corporate independence by opening his own manufacturing business. He intends
to "redesign" the wheel in the saw-blade industry. The young entrepreneur believes
his saw-blade design can cut through anything without ever dulling the blade. After
a "good-faith" search of issued patents to ensure that his blade does not infringe
another's invention, Ernie manufactures a single prototype to determine the saw
blade's acceptance among the saw-blade community. Traveling from city to city,
Ernie finds that his new saw blade has exceptional appeal among commercial
contractors. While in the City of Atlantis, Ernie is confronted by a representative of
a company who alleges that Ernie's saw-blade design infringes the company's patent.
Subsequent litigation ensues and in a timely fashion, Ernie enlists the help of his
insurance carrier for his defense. To his disappointment, Ernie's insurance company
informs him that his Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy does not expressly
include or implicitly provide coverage for lawsuits alleging patent infringement.
The above scenario has left young Ernie Entrepreneur to adjudicate and pay any
legal expenses and judgments for which he may be found liable. This is typically the
case for instances of direct patent infringement. The judicial system views the action
that triggers the infringement of a patent as the same action that triggers the injury
for purposes of insurance indemnification.1
This Comment examines the modern judicial rulings that constitute the recent
judicial trend, which has been to deny insurance coverage to alleged patent infringers
who look for litigation and damage cost coverage from their CGL policy. This
Comment also seeks to expose the illogical holdings that are at the root of this trend.
Recent modifications to the Patent Act seemingly broaden an insurer's duty to defend
a policyholder accused of committing patent infringement.
Thus, under such
modifications to the Patent Act, Ernie may find that certain acts of advertising his
"infringing" invention entitle him to turn to his CGL policy provider for the costs of
defending his claim. This Comment suggests that a liability-incurring injury should
be recognized as occurring once an infringing device or process is advertised for
commercial purposes by the alleged infringer. Arguably, once such an injury occurs,
a patentee would incur damages, i.e., lost profits.
* J.D. candidate, May 2003, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Biology, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, 1997. The author would like to thank the editorial staff of the John
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, especially Benjamin Kota for his unselfish and
continual assistance. The author dedicates this article to Teresa Hemsworth, Elizabeth Hemsworth
and Mary Jane Lyden for their combined emotional support and editorial assistance.
See DAVID A. GAUNTLETT, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS §

10.02, at 10-12 (2000).
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This Comment provides the following background material necessary to
understand fully the current state of the law, as well as proposed changes that
uncover and expose existing insurance coverage for defendants in patent
infringement actions who hold CGL policies. Part I outlines some basic, foundational
principles of Patent, Insurance, and Contract law. Part l.A introduces the concept of
patent grants; Part I.B analyzes ways in which one may infringe a patent; Part I.C
explains the high cost of patent litigation; and Part I.D illustrates different
methods-some conventional and others non-traditional-by which parties to patent
infringement actions fund the escalating costs of litigation. Part II begins with an
analysis of the "advertising injury" provision of a standard CGL policy. Part II.B
illuminates the necessity of a "nexus" between the infringement injury and the
advertising activity, and Part II.C explores the maxims of contract interpretation
that are the beginnings of exposing insurance coverage for patent litigation. Parts
II.D through II.G not only expose the fallibility of the current decision making
process but also discuss three unique approaches that can be applied to different
factual scenarios to ensure that an insurer has a duty to defend an underlying
allegation of patent infringement. Parts II.D through II.G also highlight some
inclusive indicators that exist within the current insurance policy that affirmatively
demonstrate that insurance coverage for patent infringement exists within current
CGL policies. Finally, Part III proposes that because certain advertisements may be
equated with an offer for sale, insurers should fund the defense of post-GATT
allegations of patent infringement, so long as the insured has a standard Insurance
Services Offices CGL policy with an "advertising injury" provision.

I. PATENTS, INFRINGEMENT, AND HOW TO COVER THE COSTS OF LITIGATION

A. WhatIsa Patent?
A patent is "a grant . . .of the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States."2 The United
States patent system is rooted in the Constitution.3 The Patent Clause of Article I,
Section 8 provides that "Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process,
of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout
the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that
process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.
Id.; see also 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02, at 16-6 (2000) (stating that the
issuance of a patent by the United States Patent Office includes the right to exclude others from
infringing on that which the patent is sought to protect).
3 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part sub nom. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), affd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
2
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 4 A patentee's "right to
exclude" others from his patented inventions was formally codified in 1790 when
Congress enacted the first Patent Act. 5 The grant of a patent confers upon the
patentee tremendous power to prevent others from infringing his patent rights
6
during the term of the patent.
Since the enactment of the Patent Act of 1790, Congress has amended the Act
several times, 7 modifying the protections conferred upon patentees.8 Today's current
statutory definition of a patentee's rights was amended in 1996 to include protection
against infringers who offer to sell a patented invention. 9 It follows statutorily 0 that
"whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells a patented invention"
commits direct patent infringement.11

B. Infringement and How It Occurs
The statutory definition of direct patent infringement grants to a patentee the
"right to exclude" 12 others from "making, using, selling, or offering to sell" a "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"1 3 that infringes the patentee's
patent.1 4 Substantive statutory law states that liability for infringement attaches
when one "makes" a patented device or invention. 15 Generally, it is the mere making
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 10.01[B], at 10-3 (stating that the Patent Clause of the
United States Constitution "has been interpreted to allow Congress to regulate patents").
6 Id. § 10.01[C][3], at 10-9 n.41. In accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, each patent term
runs for 20 years from the application filing date. Id.
7 See Patent Act of July 4, 1836 ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117; amended byAct of March 3, 1891, ch.
517, 26 Stat. 826; amended by35 U.S.C. § 120 (1952) (current version 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000)).
8 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); see GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 10.01[C], at 10-4. All of Congress'
subsequent revisions to the Patent Act have been in an effort to "simplify the laws and also to give
the courts direction in handling patent cases." Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see CHISUM, supra note 2, § 16.02[5][g], at 16-58. An amendment to 35
U.S.C. § 271 was effective on January 1, 1996 which added "offer to sell" as an exclusive right
conferred to a patentee. Id.
10See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
11See CHISUM, .supra note 2, § 16.02 at 16-6 n.2 (citing Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm,
453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
[T]he patentee has a certain bundle of rights-i.e. to exclude others from making,
using or selling the patented invention, and to control at the first stage the
exceptions to that exclusion by the granting of licenses. Infringement of that right
'isessentially a tort' against the patentee and 'implies invasion of some right of
the patentee' under the patent.
Id.
12 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 510 (1967).
Whoever
without authority goes against the express terms enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) is liable to the
patentee for patent infringement. Id.
',3 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
14 35 U.S.C. § 271.
] See Coakwe]], 372 F.2d at 511.
There is nothing more required for direct patent
infringement than what is outlined in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Id., see also Neff Instrument Corp. v.
Cohu Elecs., Inc., 269 F.2d 668, 673 (stating that the mere manufacture of a single device protected
by a patent is an infringement even though the device is neither used nor sold); see also CHISUM,
supra note 2, § 16.02[3] [a], at 16-34 (stating that careful statutory dissection reveals the use of the
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of a patented invention which likely gives rise to the patentee's right to exclude and
16
collect damages.
A patentee may allege three different types of patent infringement: direct
infringement; contributory infringement; or actual inducement.17 Focusing the
discussion on direct infringement, there are two possible types-literal
infringement 18 and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 19
Literal
infringement exists where "each limitation in the asserted claims [is] present in the
accused device." 20 However, some accused devices may fall outside the scope of the
patent claims. The doctrine of equivalents applies where the differences between the
patented device and the accused device are insubstantial, or where the equivalent
element in the accused device performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed
element. 21 Thus, under the doctrine of equivalents, an alleged infringer can still be
found liable for patent infringement.

C. Why the Need for Insurance Coverage?
Since the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC") in 1982, the number of patent infringement cases filed has increased over
one hundred percent. 22 Not only is the number of cases increasing, but the cost of
trying infringement cases is increasing as well. The cost of patent infringement
disjunctive "or" in both 35 U.S.C §§ 154, 271 between the list of enumerated rights conferred to the
patentee). "This codifies the long-standing rule that making a patented product without the use or
sale will constitute infringement." Id.
16 Id. § 16.02[3][a], at 16-34 (citing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass.
1813) (No. 17,600)). The court held that for every instance of patent infringement, "the legislature
intended to make every one of the enumerated acts a substantive ground of action." Id. Therefore,
the manufacture of a single patented device "justified the award of at least nominal damages." Id.
17See GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 10.01[C][2], at 10-5.
18 See CHISUM, supra note 2, § 18.04[4][a], at 18-392 (noting some court decisions that have
referred to an act of patent infringement as one of literal infringement "if the literal terms of the
claim read on the accused product or process, [then] infringement is established without further
inquiry into equivalence").
19See CHISUM, supra note 2, § 16.02, at 16-4; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 496-97 (7th

ed. 1999) (defining the Doctrine of Equivalents as '[a] judicially created theory for finding patent
infringement when the accused process or product falls outside the literal scope of the patent claims"
and noting that "[t]he doctrine evolved to prevent parties from evading liability for patent
infringement by making trivial changes to avoid the literal language of the patent claims").
20 N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
21Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997); see also Graver
Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-10 (1950) (stating that the doctrine of
equivalents is a judge-made doctrine developed to allow the courts to not only deal with "devices
that did not read upon the patent claim, but also to deal with infringers who do little more than
minor modifications to existing patented devices or processes in an attempt not to have their
infringements exposed"). "The theory is that 'if
two devices do the same work in substantially the
same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same even though they differ
in name, form, or shape."' Id. at 608.
22 See Jeffrey Dunsavage, Insuring Intellectual PropertyRemains a Niche, Despite Rapidly
Growing,Need, BuS. WIRE, Aug. 4, 1997 (stating that "the number of patent infringement lawsuits
has more than doubled" from 1982 to 1997).
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litigation from the time of filing of a complaint to the entry of final judgment can
amass an expense budget for both parties in the seven-figure dollar range. 23 Recent
studies indicate that the defense costs of patent infringement litigation can amount
to over two million dollars. 24 The extreme cost of defending against a claim of patent
infringement makes it difficult for most persons to adequately defend themselves in
such suits. The high cost of patent enforcement litigation also prevents many
persons, especially many small start-up companies, 25 from protecting (as well as
defending) their most valuable assets-issued U.S. patents. 26 An unfortunate result
of the high cost of litigation is that "most individuals or small businesses either turn
a blind eye to what's going on or come to some less-than-beneficial arrangement with
27
the infringer."

D. LitigationFundingStrategies
Because "the intellectual property ... of a company is now more valuable than
its buildings, machinery, and fixed assets," 28 the exorbitant costs of safeguarding and
defending those intellectual property rights may force many companies to seek
29
alternative forms of funding, rather than entirely absorb those costs themselves.
Some of the possible funding mechanisms for the "sport of kings" 30 include: (1)
contingent fee arrangements; 31 (2) Alternative Dispute Resolution methods (e.g.,
34
33
arbitration);32 (3) investors; or (4) insurance.

2,3 See

James G. Gilliland, Jr., The Use ofADR in IPDisputes, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, February

1997, at 34.
24 Audio tape: IP & Tech Law Monitor; The New New Media, THE RECORDER, held by
American Lawyer Media, L.P. (March 26, 2001) (transcript on file with author).
25 See Deciding When And How To Enforce Your Patent-GeneralPatent Corporation,
MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Mondaq Ltd. File; David Fanning, Intellectual
Property; Patently Obvious, POST MAGAZINE, May 25, 2000, at 21. "Three recent cases in the US
incurred defen[s]e costs ranging between $11m and $28m, and typical intellectual property
insurance policies there limit individual claims to a maximum of $1m." Fanning, id., at 21.
26 Soo John Leming, Lawsuits Prompt Need for [nsurane Protection, J. COM., June 7, 1999, at

12. "Patents can be a company's most valuable intellectual property." Id. "But protecting them can
be costly." Id.
27See Fanning, supra note 25, at 21.
28 Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, The Insurance and Management of Intellectual
PropertyRisks, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 321 n.1 (1999) (citing J. Donald Francher, How
Insurance Can Reduce IntellectualPropertyRisks, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, February 24, 1997, at 9).
29 See Leming supra note 26, at 12 (suggesting that since 1988, patent insurance is now
available to protect both the patentee from infringement of his patent as well as protect companies
from allegations of infringement if that infringement is unintentional).
'0See Frederic P. Zotos, Unlocking the Potentialfor Innovation: Walk Softly and Carry a Big
Stick, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intell. Prop. Today File (suggesting that given
these astrological costs, patent litigation has duly earned the nickname "the sport of kings").

Id.

'31

32 See Scott H.

Blackmand & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Commercial Intellectual PropertyDisputes, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1709, 1710 (Aug. 1998) ("While ADR
has become more prevalent in other areas of the law, many intellectual property attorneys do not
regularly consider ADR as one of their options."); Gilliland, supra note 23, at 34.
'33 See Zotos, supra note 30, at 26.
3' See Simensky, supra note 28, at 321.
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Similar in form and function to personal injury contingency-fee arrangements, 35
the patent bar is moving towards an acceptance of contingency-fee agreements as an
alternative to the more traditional methods of fee payment to cover the astronomical
costs of litigation. 36 The increasing number of patent infringement cases with award
amounts exceeding the $100-million mark have enticed and lured patent attorneys to
take infringement cases on a contingent-fee basis. The reason is that the amount of
money an attorney can recover may well surpass the amount he would have
recovered had he taken the case on an hourly basis. 37 But all too often, many
attorneys and firms balk at contingent-fee cases, due in large part to the enormous
38
amount of time, effort, and expense involved in a patent case.
Arbitration is a second option for "[p]eople with problems, like people with pains,
[who] want relief, and they want it as quickly and inexpensively as possible. 39 A
noteworthy benefit of electing arbitration over conventional courtroom justice is that
arbitration, when conducted with skill and experience, should cost no more than fifty
percent of what a traditional courtroom proceeding would cost. 40 The lower out-ofpocket costs of arbitration, in conjunction with potentially high awards in patent
infringement suits, lures more attorneys to reach an accord in a patent infringement
41
dispute through the process of arbitration.
A third option to funding the sport of kings is to solicit investors. 42 In some
instances, an investor may decide to put forth a portion of the funding capital after
evaluating the case's potential for yielding a satisfactory return on that investor's
investment. 43 Alternatively, a patentee may agree to give a potential investor an
44
interest in the patent royalties at the conclusion of the litigation.
A final option is the availability of insurance coverage. There are two prevalent
insurance coverage options-patent insurance coverage4 5 or coverage within the
"advertising injury" provision of a CGL policy. 46 Patent insurance attempts to fill a
'5 See Zotos, supra note 30, at 26 (stating that "the patent bar is increasingly looking to the
time-honored practices of the personal injury bar for a solution" to combat the rising cost of patent
litigation).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See Blackmand & McNeill, supra note 32, at 1723.
Even when the case has a good chance of a favorable outcome, many lawyers and

firms simply are not in a position to commit to an extensive outlay over a lengthy

Id.

period of time. For this reason, individual plaintiffs often have a great deal of
trouble finding representation on a contingent-fee basis.
I39Id. at 1711 (quoting former Chief Justice Burger).
Id. at 1725.
41 Id. at 1723-25.
40

42 See Zotos, supra note 30, at 26; see also PEARL to Acquire Interest in LAN Technology
Lawsuit, CANADIAN CORP. NEWS, Feb. 24, 2000 [hereinafter PEARL].
43 See Zotos, supra note 30, at 26.
11 See PEARL, supra note 42 (stating that Intellectual Property Resource Corporation (IPRC)
of Louisville, Kentucky "has been investing in patents and enforcing litigation since 1992" and has
subsequently received a "10.5% carried interest in any proceeds from a patent issued in 1987
covering critical aspects of the local area network technology").
4 See Simensky, supra note 28, at 329-32 (discussing patent insurance policies, what is
covered, what is not covered, scope of policies, and cost, as well as special considerations).
46 Id. at 331-34 (outlining the "advertising injury" provision of a standard ISO issued CGL
insurance policy).
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need within the insurance industry. Corresponding to a large increase in intellectual
property litigation, insurance companies, such as American International Group, Inc.
("AIG") and Lloyd's of London, have recently begun to offer insurance policies that
cover losses due to alleged patent infringement. 47 Specifically, AIG's policies can
cover the majority of costs incurred in defending a suit, including damage awards,
attorney costs, and settlement payments. 48 However, such policies do not encompass
litigation costs associated with determining whether a person has willfully infringed
another's patent. 49 On the downside, the cost to a corporation to have such a policy
50
can amount to over $3,000 annually.
The other source of insurance coverage for a corporate defendant in a patent
infringement action can be found in the "advertising injury" provision of a CGL
policy. 51 An in-depth examination of the current CGL "advertising injury" provision
merged with an examination of the post-1996 change to the definition of direct patent
infringement warrants a complete reversal in the judicial trend of denying coverage
for the defense of patent infringement actions.

II. OH COVERAGE, OH COVERAGE, WHEREFORE ART THOU?
A. An 'AdvertisingInjury"
Commercial enterprises looking to protect their investment with an insurance
policy usually find that a CGL 52 policy provides the necessary protection that they
desire.53 Broad-form CGL policies are a form of liability insurance. 54 The purpose of
these policies is to provide broad coverage for a range of risks that may befall the
55
policyholder.
Not until the second half of the twentieth century did insurance policy language
standardize within the insurance industry. 56 The standardization of wording among
insurance-industry contracts has become even more uniform in the area of

47Id. at

329.

4 Id.
4 Id.
o Id. at 330.
, Id. at 33132.

52 See 2D ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 1.15,
at 65 (2d ed. 1996).
53 Id.
5 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 806 (7th ed. 1999) (defining liability insurance as "an
agreement to cover a loss resulting from one's liability to a third party . . .[t]he insured's claim
under the policy arises once the insured's liability to a third party has been asserted").
5 Soo 2D HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 52, § 1.15, at 65. The insurance industry has divided

available insurance policies to encompass two different forms of coverage-policies that afford
coverage for a specific type of risk or injury and those that can encompass a wide range of risks or
injuries. Id.
5 See id. "Prior to 1940, each insurance company drafted its own CGL policy and considerable
confusion resulted from the diverse language adopted by different insurers." Id. "Consequently, the
insurance industry voluntarily set about to standardize the CGL contract language." Id.
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property/casualty policies with the help of the Insurance Services Offices ("JSO").57
In 1976, the ISO included for the first time in their broad-form CGL Endorsements a
provision for "advertising injury" liability coverage. 58
This "advertising injury"
provision is the means by which many corporations have sought to find coverage for
59
the costs of defending against IP actions initiated against them.
Since the inclusion of this provision in 1976, the ISO's CGL provision affording
coverage for advertising injuries was changed once in 1986.60 While the language of
today's policy 61 differs from that which emerged in 1976, the coverage afforded is still
the same. An example of a typical "advertising injury" provision reads:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
personal injury or advertising injury to which this insurance applies . . .
arising out of the conduct of the named insured's business.
'Advertising injury' means injury arising out of one or more of the
following offenses:

c. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business; or
62
d. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.

57 Id. at 66. (noting that the ISO is a "service organization whose membership consists
exclusively of property/casualty insurers."); see also GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 1.02[B], at 1-9 n.4
("The ISO is an association of insurers that develops standard forms of policies.").
58 See CLARANCE E. HAGGLUND ETAL., CGL POLICY HANDBOOK § 10.01 at 10-3 (2001).
59 See Simensky, supra note 28, at 331 (stating that while there was a period of years where
intellectual property specialists based their assumption on case law that intellectual property suits

were not covered by CGL policies, recent court decisions have found that many IP suits are covered
within the "advertising injury" provision of a CGL policy).
60 See GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 1.02[B], at 1-9. The language of the 1976 ISO policy
provision encompassing advertising injuries "provided for coverage of 'piracy [or] unfair competition'
committed or alleged to have been committed during the policy period." Id. That phrase preceded
the 1986 ISO policy language, which covers offenses of "misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business." Id.
(31See HAGGLUND ET AL., supra note 58, § 10.01 at 10-4. While the ISO's CGL policy has been
updated since 1986, in 1998, 1992 and 1996, those updates have had no effect on the advertising
injury provisions since the language has remained the same with regard to the sections affecting
advertising injury coverage. Id. "[T]he 1998 policy narrows somewhat coverage for 'advertisement'
and for intellectual property claims." Id.; see also GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 1.01[D], at 1-8
(explaining that a more recent amendment to the ISO's CGL policy regarding advertising injury
coverage greatly modifies the wording of the of the 1986 policy). This 1998 ISO CGL policy (CG 00
01 07 98) has been approved by most Department of Insurances throughout the United States. Id.
"[T]he ISO has stated that the language changes between the two policies were not intended to
change the scope of coverage." Simensky, supra note 28, at 332.
62 See GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 1.0l1B], at 1-4 n.2. "Commercial General Liability Coverage
Form CG 00 01 (ed. 11-85)." Id.
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[T]his insurance applies to "advertising injury" only if caused by an
offense committed...
63
(2) in the course of advertising your goods, products or services.

For CGL policyholders to find coverage within the advertising injury provision of
their policy, the insured's pending action must satisfy a three-part advertising injury
test: "(1) the insured must be engaged in an advertising activity; (2) the underlying
allegations must fall within the scope of the named offense; and (3) the injury must
arise out of an offense committed in the course of the policyholder's advertising
activity." 64 Of the aforementioned parts of the test, the third prong, namely the
establishment of a nexus between the "insured's advertising activities and the offense
66
charged," 65 has been the most problematic for policyholders.

B. The Question of Proximity or 'Nexus" Requirement
The ISO CGL advertising injury provision requires that the injury for which
insurance coverage is sought "arise out of' the insured's advertising activity. 67 A
review of the principles of tort law reveals that the phrase "arise out of' is not the
language of direct causation. 68 While there is great disparity among the federal
district courts as to how close the nexus must be, 69 it is clear that there must be some
"causal relationship" between the patent infringement and the advertising activity. 70
Without a reasonable nexus requirement, an argument could be made that "any
harmful act, if it were advertised in some way, would fall under the grant of coverage
merely because it was advertised."71 So long as one's "direct patent infringement
occurs in the course of the insured's advertising activities, the causal nexus

(3 See id. § 1.01[B], at 1-4 n.3. "Courts have held that the phrase 'arising out of contained in
most policies means 'connected with,' 'growing out of,' and other very broad, general and
comprehensive terms." Id. "To qualify as an 'advertising injury' which 'arises out of a covered
offense, the offense need only bear a 'casual relationship' to the advertising."
Id.; see also
GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 10.05[A][I], at 10-34 (stating that the "term 'arising out of means
'incident to or having connection with'). "As long as the direct patent infringement occurs in the
course of the insured's advertising activities, the causal nexus requirement of the 'occur in the
course of language is satisfied and coverage may properly arise." Id.

GAUNTLETT, supranote 1, § 10.02, at 10-11.
i See id. § 10.05[A], at 10-34 ("Advertising injury coverage requires that the injury 'arise out of
an offense committed during the policy period in the course of the named insured's advertising
activities."'). "The causal nexus must be between the enumerated offense and the advertising
activity." Id. at 10-35.
64See

66 Id

Id. at 10-34.
(S See GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 10.05[A], at 10-34. "California insurance coverage law, as
67

well as that of the vast majority of states is clear: the term 'arising out of is not language of direct
causation." Id.

(3 See id. § 2.04[A], at 2-13.
70 See id. § 10.02, at 1011.
71 See Bank of the W. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 833 P.2d 545, 559 (Cal. 1992).
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requirement of the 'occur in the course of language is satisfied and coverage may
properly arise.

' 72

C. Issue to Defend in Light of Insurance-ContraetAmbiguities
Courts addressing issues of whether an insurance company must defend a
policyholder's action turn to basic principles of contract construction.7 3
These
principles direct the courts to look to the wording of the insurance contract to
determine the parties' intent.7 4 The starting point for any question of contract
interpretation is the language and words of the policy.7 5 Comparison of the "intent"
of the policy to the allegations of the complaint will determine if the insurer has an
7 6
obligation to defend the insured's claim.
When determining the availability or lack of coverage for the insured's claim,
courts construe the insurance contract's policy provisions "as a layperson would read
them." 7 7 Ambiguities arising during the interpretation of an insurance policy shall
be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.78 If an ambiguity

persists while interpreting the policy's provisions, ample case law,7

72 See GAUNTLETT, supranote 1,

9

as well as

§ 10.05[A][1], at 10-34.

7' See 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.3 n.8 (Lexis 2001).
71 See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 172 n.7 (Cal. 1966) (stating that "[c]ourts have ...

applied the doctrine of reasonable expectation to the interpretation of insurance contracts") (citing
Atl. Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 416 P.2d 801, 809 (Cal. 1966)). "In interpreting an insurance
contract we must consider the intent and reasonable expectations of the parties in entering into the
agreement." Id.
75See 4 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 16.03 (Release No. 68 2001).
76 See Copart, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., Nos. 99-17380, 99-17470, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 6140,
at *2*3 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2001) (citing Peerless Lighting Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 98 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 753, 759 (Cal Ct. App. 2000)). An insurer must defend an action for the insured when the
facts in the complaint disclose a bare potential for coverage. Id.; see also Montrose Chem. Corp. of
Cal. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1993) ("[A]" liability insurer owes a
broad duty to defend its insured against claims that create a potential for indemnity." (citing Horace
Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 795 (Cal. 1993))).
77 See Peerless, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759 (stating that the "clear and explicit" meaning of the
ambiguous contractual provisions shall be interpreted by the court in their "ordinary and popular
sense"); see also Atlantic, 416 P.2d at 809 (stating that courts must "evaluate not only [the insurer's]
contract form, but also [the insured's] knowledge and understanding as a layman and his normal
expectation of the extent of coverage of the poliey') (emphasis added); GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, §
10.04[B] [3], at 10-30. It is the law of many jurisdictions of the country that the courts therein must
interpret and give meaning to the words of an insurance policy as a "layman would read them and
not as they might be analyzed by an attorney or an insurance expert." Id. This may include using a
dictionary to find the plain meaning associated with the terms of the insurance policy contract. Id.
78 Green Mach. Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, No. 99-3048, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13378, at
*8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2001).
See Westchester Resco, L.P. v. New England Reins. Corp., 818 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1987)
in an insurance policy are to be construed strictly against the insurer"); see also
Semmes Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1207 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that "the rule of
,construction against the draftsman' ... applies with particular force ... 'incases where the drafting
7

('[A]mbiguities

party has the stronger bargaining position'); Indiana Comprehensive Health Ins. Ass'n v. Dye, 531
N.E.2d 505, 507 (Ind.App. 1988) ("When interpreting an insurance contract, and all other contracts
of adhesion .... in cases of ambiguity where more than one reasonable interpretation is possible and
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judicial maxims of contract interpretation,8 0 provide support for the proposition that

ambiguities should be construed against the insurer.8 ' The existence of ambiguities
in contractual provisions providing coverage for offenses which amount to advertising
injuries has been the "source" or starting point for policyholders finding coverage for
IP suits. 8 2
It is well established that a duty to defend an action not only arises before an
84
insurer's duty to indemnify,8 3 but also is broader than the duty to indemnify. It
follows that "if the underlying complaint alleges multiple claims, some of which are
covered under the policy and some of which are not, the duty to defend arises if at
least one of the claims in the complaint is within the policy's coverage."8 5 Therefore,
determining whether an insurer's duty to defend has arisen, courts "line-up" the four
corners of the insurance policy with the four corners of the complaint looking for any
overlap.8 6 If the court does establish any overlap, this alone gives rise to an insurer's
duty to defend and pay for an insured's litigation expenses. 8 7 The action of the court
pairing up the claim with the insured's insurance policy, known as the "eight-corners
rule,"88 is the point where examination of coverage for patent infringement begins to
emerge.

especially where a coverage exclusion is involved, then the court must adopt the interpretation most
favorable to the insured.").
80See CORBIN, supra note 73, § 24.27.
81 See Atlantic, 416 P.2d at 808; see also CORBIN, supra note 73, § 24.27 ("The 'contra
proferentem' device is intended to aid a party whose bargaining power was less than that of the
draftsperson."). The maxim of contraproferentern spells out a "general rule that an ambiguity will
be resolved against the one who prepared the document." Id. Also, since a "[d]isparity of bargaining
power is likely to exist when a person applies for an insurance policy . . . ambiguities in an
insurance policy are generally to be construed strictly against the insurer." Id.
82 See William P. Kelly, Insurance Law Annual: Scope of Advertising Injury Under Iowa Law
in Commercial General LiabilityPolicies, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 625, 625-26 (2000) (stating that within
the context of insurance law, advertising injury is a type of liability insurance, and due to the
judicially determined ambiguous nature of the term "advertising injury," corporations have sought
to find coverage for there Intellectual Property suits within the provision).
83 Id. at 627.
84 See Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal.
1993).
85 See Ryland Group, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., NO. A-00-CA-233 JRN, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21412, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2000).
86 Id. at "11-'12.
87 See Montrose, 861 P.2d at 1157. "The determination whether the insurer owes a duty to

defend is made in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of
the policy." Id. "For an insurer, the existence of a duty to defend turns not upon the ultimate
adjudication of coverage under its policy of insurance, but upon those facts known by the insurer at
the inception of a third party lawsuit." Id. "Hence, the duty 'may exist even where coverage is in
doubt and ultimately does not develop."' Id.
88 See Ryland, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21412, at *12-*13 ([W]here the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to clearly bring the case within or without the coverage, the general rule is that the
insurer is obligated to defend if there is, potentially, a case under the complaint within the coverage
of the policy."). "Stated differently, in case of doubt as to whether or not the allegations of a
complaint against the insured state a cause of action within the coverage of a liability policy
sufficient to compel the insurer to defend the action, such doubt will be resolved in the insured's
favor." Id.
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D. Progressionfrom Coverage-to No Coverage-Backto Coverage
Judicial decisions of the past decade mirror case precedent and the growing
trend,8 9 which avoids stretching the reach of COL policies to policyholders sued for
acts of alleged patent infringement.90 One case that is alleged to have initiated the
trend in favor of insurers is Bank of the West v. Superior Court of Contra Costa
County.91 Even though Bank of the West92 involved insurance coverage for
petitioner's unfair business practices, 93 the court in dicta outlined maxims of COL
advertising injury coverage afforded for IP suits. These maxims have been at the
foundation of the judicial decision-making process in the area of advertising injury
94
coverage for IP suits. In addition to spelling out an IP injury's nexus requirement,
one sentence of this heavily cited 1992 case ruled out all possibility that future
litigants would find coverage for patent infringement litigation within an insured's
CCL policy advertising injury provision. 95 The sweeping statement by the justices of
the Supreme Court of California is just one of a limited number of fact-specific
decisions that insurers have relied on to preclude coverage for most patent
infringement claims.96
The Bank of the West holding was furthered and strengthened by a Ninth
97
Circuit decision less than two years later in bolab Corp. v. Seaboard Surety Co.
Unlike Bank of the West, the underlying litigation of Iolab involved indemnification
for a settlement paid for a prior act of patent infringement.98 Although lolab and
89 See Jason A. Reyes, Note, Patents and Insurance: Who WilPay for Infringement? 1 B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 3 (1995) (outlining a linear progression of increasing denial of coverage afforded to
insured's by the courts interpreting the insured's CGL policy for coverage in patent litigation). The
trend began in the year 1988 with the case Aetna Casualty v. Watereioud granting coverage for a
patent issue and culminates in 1994 with Intex Plastics v. United National Insurance denying
coverage within the CGL policy. Id.; see also David A. Gauntlett, Patents and Insurance: Who Will
Pay for Reimbursement? 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 6 para. 1 (1998) (introducing the article with the
proposition that up until 1996, many of the patent infringement cases that were litigated in the
United States were not decided in favor of the policyholder).
90 See Simply Fresh Fruit v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the defendant insurer was not obligated to defend the plaintiff policy holder in actions of patent
infringement); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Advanced Interventional Systems, 824 F.
Supp. 583, 586 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that "patent infringement does not fall within the scope of
'advertising injury,' . . . even though the insured advertises the infringing product, if the claim of
infringement is based on the sale or importation of the product rather than its advertisement").
91 833 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1992) (holding that insurance policies covering advertising injuries
provide coverage only for claims that arise out of common law unfair competition actions).
92 Id.
9

Id.

94 Id. at 560 (holding "that 'advertising injury' must have a causal connection with the
insured's 'advertising activities' before there can be coverage").
9 Id. at 561 (holding that patent infringement "does not 'occur in the course of... advertising
activities' within the meaning of the policy even though the insured advertises the infringing
product, if the claim of infringement is based on the sale or importation of the product rather than
its advertisement" (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77, 80 (1989))).
96 See Gauntlett, supra note 89, at 6 (stating that much of the recent decisions which have
found against the interests of the policyholders were based on decisions that have "factually narrow
precedents which fail to foreclose coverage for a variety of plausible scenarios").
97 15 F.3d 1500 (9th Cir. 1994).
98 Id. at 1502. The plaintiff-appellant Iolab was sued in an original action by Dr. Ronald P.
Jensen, a patent owner on an intraocular lens designed to replace a human's natural lens. Id. The
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plaintiff Jensen settled on a figure lower than the court-assessed damages, 99 olab
initiated a third-party action against Seaboard (their insurer) for compensation and
10 1
indemnification 0 0 under the advertising injury provision of their CGL policy.
As in Bank of the West, the Ninth Circuit held that "unless Dr. Jensen's claim
was that olab infringed his patent in its advertising, in a manner independent of its
sale of the ... lens, the Jensen" injury does not arise out of advertising. 10 2 Therefore,
the court backed and strengthened its holding that "patent infringement cannot
constitute an advertising injury,"10 3 since patents are not infringed by advertising but
instead by the enumerated acts of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).104 Under Bank of the West,
olab's advertising activity need only violate one of the enumerated acts that
statutorily define patent infringement in order for coverage to be afforded.10 5 The
Jolab court emphasized that for an insured to find insurance coverage within a CGL's
advertising injury provision, the insured must show that the advertising activity
caused the patent infringement. 106
A final case emphasizing the trend followed by the judicial community regarding
questions of CGL insurance coverage for patent infringement actions is Simply Fresh
Fruit v. Continental Insurance Co.107 The Ninth Circuit held true to form and
followed the precedent spelled out five years earlier in Bank of the West. The court

Iolab/Jensen action culminated in August 1990 with a verdict for Jensen and the court folding that
bolab committed patent infringement. Id. The court awarded damages would have amounted to
excess of $33 million. Id. at 1503.
99 Id. at 1503.
100 See GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 10.04[A], at 10-24. "Iolab, however, is distinguishable as it
is limited to direct patent infringement claims arising out of sale of infringing products." Id. "The
olab decision only involved the question of the insurer's duty to indemnify for the sums the insured
paid to settle the underlying direct infringement claims." Id. "The Iolab court did not address the
duty to defend the underlying direct infringement claim." Id. "[T]he carrier must defend a suit
which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy." Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v.
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1993). "Implicit in this rule is the principle
that the duty to defend is broaderthan the duty to indemnify; an insurer may owe a duty to defend
its insured in an action in which no damages ultimately are awarded." Id.
101 See Jolab Corp., 15 F.3d at 1503. The opinion lists all fifteen insurers of Iolab; four primary
and eleven "excess insurers." Id. Of the four primary insurers, Seaboard provided the longest term
of coverage, spanning over eight years. Id.
102 Id. at 1505-06 (emphasis added) (asserting that this conclusion was reached following the
logic outlined in Bank of the West, which requires that the advertising injury have a causal
connection to the "insured's advertising activities" before a CGL policy's advertising injury provision
will offer coverage).
103 Id.
104 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(1994) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, or sells any patented
invention .....
105

Id.

bolab, 15 F.3d at 1507 (dictating when the court explained that "Iolab's claim with
regard to the relationship between its advertising activities and the Jensen loss does not establish
the causal nexus required by Bank of the Wesf'). "Iolab fails to show that the Jensen loss was
caused by its advertising rather than its infringement of Dr. Jensen's patent." Id. It was not the
advertising that "caused" the infringement, because "advertising" is not one of the three enumerated
forms of patent infringement listed in the Patent Act. Id.
107 94 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1996). The underlying action for which Simply Fresh was attempting
to have Continental Insurance indemnify it was a case of alleged patent infringement. Id. at 1220.
The original action was commenced by Reddi-Made corporation against Simply Fresh Fruit for their
alleged infringement of Reddi-Made's patents for a fruit-cutting device. Id. at 1221.
106 See
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held that as a matter of law, an insured's patent infringement cannot occur in the
course of its advertising activities. 108 Again the court reasoned that because a patent
infringement injury "could have occurred independent and irrespective of any
advertising" 10 9 by the insured, the causal nexus requirement of Bank of the West was
not satisfied. 110

E. Coverage, Where Are You NOW?
On January 1, 1996, an amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) added "offer to sell" as
one of the enumerated ways in which an individual could infringe a patent.11 1 This
addition to 35 U.S.C § 271(a) was the result of U.S. codification of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").112 It has been argued that with the
addition of "offer to sell" as a fourth enumerated offense of direct patent
infringement, "the nexus required between the alleged infringing activities and
'advertising' under Advertising Injury Coverage now should easily be met." 113
Reflective of the post-1996 change to the Patent Act, 114 Judge Conti held that the
insured in Everett Associates v. TranscontinentalInsurance Co.115 had a reasonable
expectation to assume insurance coverage for direct patent infringement, stating that
the issued "CGL policy could reasonably be construed to cover claims for patent
11 6
infringement."

108

Id. at 1222.

109 Id.
110 See Simply Fresh Fruit,94 F.3d at 1223 (It "isnow the clearly established law in California
... that the injury for which coverage is sought must be caused by the advertising itself." (citing
Microtech Research, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1994))).
''I See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Lab. Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
The amendment to § 271(a) represents a distinct change to the bases for patent
infringement, because liability arose previously only as the result of an actual
sale .... Little interpretation of this change as it relates to direct infringement
under § 271(a) has been given, and no guidance on whether state law applies
when determining if an 'offer to sell' has occurred.
Id.; Everett Assoc., Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Corp., No. C-97-4308 SC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11792, at "15-*16 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 1999) (explaining that Congress' change to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
may have changed the "landscape" of case law on which the defendant relies). The defendant in
Everett was relying on Bank of the West, which was decided and adhered to up to this point. Id.
112 EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 16.05[c] (2d ed. 2000)
(explaining that the adoption of GATT effectuated the changes in the Patent Act which increased
the number of enumerated direct patent infringement violations from three to four).
113 Id.
Anderson et al. state that the case law decisions and precedent which hold that direct
patent infringement cannot arise within the "advertising activities" of the insured and
consequentially did not fall within the scope of the advertising injury provision of the insured's CGL
policy should be revisited and questioned. Id. The pre-1996 litigation's holdings may have little
value to new litigation involving alleged patent infringement since the "nexus" gap seems to have
been minimized. Id.; see Kelly, supra note 82, at 630-31. "[T]he explanation that [an] injury must
merely 'arise out of the advertising activities 'suggests a minimal, tangential connection between
the injury and the advertising."' Id. "Courts gave 'advertising,' 'arise out of,' and 'offense' a fairly
broad construction allowing many claims to be defended under the language of the 1973 form." Id.
114 35 U.S.C § 271(a) (2000).
11,No. C-97-4308 SC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 1999)
''6 Id. at *7.
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In the underlying action, 117 Everett Associates was sued for patent
infringement. 118 Subsequently, Everett sought the costs of its defense against the
underlying action from its insurance carrier, Transcontinental. Transcontinental,
however, denied that it had a duty to defend Everett or indemnify Everett for the
patent infringement action. 119 The court held that "whether the policy language can
be interpreted to cover patent infringement claims depends on a two-step
analysis." 120 First the court must determine if the language of the policy is
ambiguous. Second, the court must look to the objectively reasonable expectations of
the insured and determine if there was an underlying intent that the policy would
12
cover the costs of defending against a patent infringement action. '
The first prong of the test has its origins in the California Supreme Court's Bank
of the West decision, which outlined the analysis and criteria that some courts
currently use in determining the presence of ambiguities in the insurance policy
language. 122 Grounding Everett's decision on both the holdings of Bank of the West
and Lebas Fashion Imports, 23 the court held124that the insured's advertising injury
provision of its CGL policy was ambiguous.
The policy's ambiguity was with
respect to the coverage afforded by a "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style
of doing business" because several of the terms, "from the point of view of a
126
layman," 125 could be assigned two or more reasonable definitions.

117 Clark v. Everett Assoc., No. SA CV 97-351-GLT, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22259 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 26, 1998).
118 See Everett, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792, at *2. The defendant Everett in the underlying
action was sued by the plaintiff who alleged that defendant had "advertised, offered to sell,
manufactured, and sold portable massage tables that infringed a patent owned" by the plaintiff
Clark. Id.
119 Id. at *2-*3.
120 Id.
at *9. The court outlined the two-step analysis; first, if the insurance policy in question
does not provide the coverage that the insured expressly seeks in its claim to the insurer, the court
must determine if the language of the policy is ambiguous. Id. Secondly, if the language of the
policy is found by the court to be ambiguous, then "the court must look to the objectively reasonable
expectations of the insured to determine if the policy could be construed to cover patent
infringement claims." Id.
121 Id.
122

Id. at

* 9 - 1 0 ("[A] court that is faced with an argument for coverage based on assertedly

ambiguous policy language must first attempt to determine whether coverage is consistent with the
insured's objectively reasonable expectations. In doing so, the court must interpret the language in
context, with regard to its intended function." (citing Bank of the W. v. Superior Court of Contra
Costa County, 833 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1992))).
123 Lebas Fashion Imps. of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 50 Cal. App. 4th 548 (1996).
The Lebas court was forced to decide whether the provision of the insured's CGL policy covering
"advertising injuries" could encompass a non-enumerated tort of trademark infringement if it was
found to have ambiguous language. Id. The plaintiff relied on the provision of his CGL policy that
afforded coverage for offenses committed in the "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business." Id. The Lebas court held that the "misappropriation" clause was in fact ambiguous
to the insured and "could reasonably be construed to include claims for trademark infringement,
another significant and expensive tort which is not specifically enumerated as an advertising
offense." Id.
124 Everett, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792, at *15.
125 Id.
at *13. When analyzing the terminology of an insurance policy, the court should give the
terminology its plain meaning and not the meaning that an attorney or an insurance expert would
give to them. Id.
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After concluding that the first part of the test was satisfied, the Everett court
moved to the second prong of the test, attempting to resolve the ambiguity by
"looking to the objectively reasonable expectations of [the insured]."127 Prior case law
examining this question has held that patent infringement "could not reasonably be
construed to be an 'advertising injury' for purposes of a CGL policy." 128 Litigation
that involves an allegation of patent infringement must consequently be reexamined
for a potential of coverage due to the addition of the infringing act of "offer[ing] to
sell" to the Patent Act in 1996.129 Since the complaint of the underlying Clark action
went so far as to stipulate and charge that the defendant "offered to sell ... products
infringing [Clark's patent,"130 the court determined that the "[p]laintiff had an
objectively reasonable expectation that the CGL policy would cover patent
1 31
infringement claims for advertising a patented product."

F. IfIt Was Never Excluded... ItMust Be Included...
Contained within a standard ISO-format CGL Insurance policy, a policyholder
can expect to find five basic components or sections, one of which should be entitled
"Exclusions and Exceptions."1 32 Standard coverage parts do not mean identical
133
coverages that cannot be customized to meet the individual policyholder's needs.
126Id. at *13-*14. The Lebas court found that the coverage stipulation in question contained
three ambiguities: (1) misappropriation, (2) advertising idea, and (3) style of doing business. Id.
128

Id.
Id. at *15.

129

Id.

127

at *16.

The mere fact that the litigation in taking place after the January 1, 1996

amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) does not automatically determine that the amended version of he
statute is the applicable and controlling rule. Id. The amendment to the statute is applicable in this
case because the underlying accusation of alleged patent infringement took place after January 1,
1996. Id.; see also GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 11.03[B], at 11-17 (noting that the decision in Bank
of the West held that a patent infringement claim could not occur in the course of advertising
activities because the infringing activity was based on the sale of the product rather than its
advertisement; it is now worth noting that '[b]y virtue of the amendment to the Patent Act, the
claim [of patent infringement] is based, at least in part, on the advertisement of the patented
product").
130 See Everett, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792, at *16.
131Id. at *22. The court went on to hold that "the advertising injury provisions in the CGL
policy could reasonably be construed to cover claims for patent infringement." Id. The court reached
this conclusion be finding that the "'offer to sell' language in the Patent Act, which may permit
claims of patent infringement based on advertising alone, could create the required causal
connection [to] permit coverage of patent infringement claims under a CGL policy." Id. at *20.
132 See HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 52, § 117.1 (explaining that the same five essential
elements create a pattern within most standard form insurance contracts used today: (1) the
DeclarationsPage (or "DEC" sheet); (2) InsuringAgreements; (3) Exclusions and Exceptions; (4)
Conditions; and (5) Definitions).
133 See HOLMES & RHODES, supranote 52, § 117.1.
For example, ISO maintains five basic coverage parts, 73 countrywide
endorsements, and 118 state-specific endorsements for the Homeowners line
alone.
With this variety of standard coverage parts, insurers can write
Homeowners insurance for an apartment renter in Brooklyn who owns a large
collection of art, a condo owner in Duluth who has installed a sauna and burglar
alarm and wants high levels of liability coverage, or a homeowner in Palo Alto
who has a swimming pool and tennis courts-all using ISO coverage parts.
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The exclusion section's purpose is to eliminate "certain events or conditions from
coverage" of the insurance policy's coverage. 134 As aforementioned, in the 1930's, the
CGL policy was developed and written as a liability policy to provide coverage for a
wide-range 35 of "accidents" or "occurrences." 136 It is in the exclusion's provision of
the ISO's CGL form contract that an insurer may amend or customize coverage for
137
the individual insured.
With that in mind, "if the insurers desired to avoid any potential for coverage of
patent infringement lawsuits, they could have sought to expressly exclude patent
infringement actions." 138 Industrial Molding Corp. v. American Manufacturers
Mutual Insurance Co. 13 9 supports the proposition that if an insurer meant to omit an
area from the coverage of a CGL policy, then the insurer would enumerate any
140
deletions within the Exclusion section of the issued policy.
Union Insurance Co. v. Knife Co.141 provides additional support for the
proposition that a CGL policy is all encompassing with the exception of the
enumerated exceptions. After the defendant corporation was sued in the underlying
action for trademark infringement, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment as to
whether it had a duty to defend under terms of the CGL insurance policy. 142 The
court held that:
If the drafters of this insurance policy wanted to limit their exposure to
'suits arising under the common law tort of misappropriation' or to exclude
exposure for 'actions involving trademarks,' it would have been a simple

Id.
134

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 586 (7th ed. 1999).

13",See Kelly, supra note 82, at 630-31 (stating that the addition of the advertising injury
provision to the CGL policy "was originally sold to 'many thousands of policyholders with the
promise of providing even 'broader' coverage than already provided by 'comprehensive' general
liability insurance policies').
136 See HOLMES & RHODES, supranote 52, § 117.1.
Whereas insurance coverage generally can be written to cover all risks or only
specified risks, all liability insurance by custom in the insurance industry
provides all-risk coverage. In the 1930s, the insurance industry developed
comprehensive liability insurance coverage to prevent overlapping of the specified
risk approach and to minimize gaps in coverage.
Id.
137 Id. § 6.5 n.16. The "[p]urpose of liability insurance contract is to provide protection against
liability claims, and policy terms must be given interpretation consistent with that purpose, with
limitations and exclusions strictly construed." Id.
138

See GAUNTLETT, supra note 1, § 10.04[A], at 10-20; see also Simensky, supra note 28, at

333-34 (listing the following exclusion clause from an actual policy as representative of how to
properly ensure that a policy does not cover patent infringement suits; "[T]his policy does not apply

to any claim against the [insured] based on, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from, in
consequence of, or in any way involving any actual or alleged infringement of patent . . .");

Gauntlett, supra note 89 (questioning the need for the addition of IP exclusions to the advertising
injury provision of a CGL policy if the policy was never drafted to encompass IP suits in the first
place).
"3917 F. Supp. 2d 633 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
140

Id. at 637.

"1 897 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Ark. 1995).
142 Id.
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matter to do so. In fact, previous policies apparently did expressly exclude
143
actions for trademarks.
While this Comment has focused on patent infringement, it naturally follows
that broad-form CGL policies can be (and should be) "tailor-made." This is
accomplished through careful use and crafting of a policy's Exclusions and
Exceptions section because most often the specific torts 144 listed in the language of a
CGL policy will contain an ambiguity that may be overly exploited.145

G. Money Is the Root of Al That is Evil...
In the preceding discussion of the cases mentioned in this Comment, it was
noted that the underlying actions (which preceded the accused infringers' claims for
146
defense cost coverage) comprised more than just a claim for patent infringement.
The causes of action brought against alleged infringers suggest that the true injury
suffered as a result of patent infringement is not in the mere "mak[ing], us[ing],
offering] for sale, or sell[ing]" the invention. 147 The true injury does not seem to
arise until a patentee is deprived of lost profits, an injury more offensive than
replication of a patented invention. It is worth repeating that "the intellectual
property capacity of a company is now more valuable than its buildings, machinery,
and fixed assets."1 48 The explicit and implicit value of a patent is too great to
ignore-as evidenced by the fact that a number of patent litigation suits have
involved sums in excess of $100 million. 149 Implicitly, the monetary value of
intellectual property, patents especially, can be deduced by an examination of the
amount of money that companies are either willing to expend to protect patents from
infringement, or if need be, to fund expensive lawsuits to stop others from infringing
their patents.1 50
A deviation from the substantive law of patents as the

Id. at 1216.
Soo Kelly, supra note 82, at 630-31 ("[N]early all of the enumerated torts are intentional,
and there is no indication the words used in the definition of advertising injury are words of
limitation.").
', See Everett Assoc., Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Corp., No. C-97-4308 SC, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11792, at *8*13 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 1999) (explaining that just because coverage for a tort
that is not listed within the enumerated torts in a CGL policy does not preclude the insurer's duty to
defend).
16 See Simply Fresh Fruit v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 1219, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that of
the three claims filed by Reddi-Made, the claim filed in state court "contained allegations of: (1)
misappropriation of trade secrets, (2) breach of contract, (3) violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, and (4) intentional interference with economic advantage"); Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15
F.3d 1500, 1506 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that Iolab was held liable in the underlying Jensen patent
infringement action based and calculated on the corporation's for-profit sales of the infringing lens);
Tradesoft Techs., Inc. v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., 746 A.2d 1078, 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000) (stating that one of the underlying actions against Tradesoft Technologies Inc. was for unfair
competition).
14735 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
148 See Simensky, supra note 28, at 321.
19 See Zotos, supra note 30, at 26.
150 Id.
143
14
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determinative factor for when a patent infringement injury arises is not even
required.
Therefore, the judicial community needs to reevaluate the distinction it has
established between the mere advertising of a patented device or process and an offer
for sale. 151 "Many of the decisions against policyholders have primarily relied on
factually narrow precedents which fail to foreclose coverage for a range of
scenarios."

1 52

III. CONCLUSION
Analogous to the question of whether a falling tree in the woods makes a sound
is the question of when does patent infringement really injure the patentee? If one
suggests that a patentee is truly not injured until an alleged patent infringer is about
to commercialize a patentee's invention, every altruistic patentee will scream that a
patent is worth much more to them than its weight in gold.
Both the Congressional beginnings of the patent statutes and the history of the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 reveal that our founding fathers
"properly intended to encourage economic progress when they wrote into the U.S.
Constitution the basis for the patent system."1 53 Therefore, remaining consistent
with the intent of our founding fathers, the judiciary should recognize as well that
another entrepreneur's efforts in making a profit from a patentee's invention is the
true injury that should give rise to an insurer's duty to defend.
The "fatal injury" which fulfills the nexus requirement, giving rise to an
insurer's duty to defend an insured against a patent infringement action, should be
recognized as the mere act of advertising an infringing good. The reason for this is
because an offer for sale is now an enumerated infringing act in the Patent Act.
"Advertising an invention constitutes an offer for sale when it creates in the
purchaser's mind a reasonable belief that the invention is being offered for sale."1

prerequisite to such cases will require courts
determination of whether an alleged infringer's
reasonable belief that a device is being offered for
helps complete the causal-nexus analysis, triggering

54

A

to engage in a fact-specific
advertising activity led to a
sale; 15 5 creation of such a belief
an insurer's duty to defend.

15] 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
152 See Gauntlett, supra note 89, at 6.

1 See Mondaq, supra note 25.
1 See Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("While
there is no requirement that the purchaser have actual knowledge of the invention to invoke the on
sale bar, what the purchaser reasonably believes the inventor to be offering is relevant to whether,
on balance, the offer objectively may be said to be of the patented invention.").
155 See generally Rotec Indus., Inc., v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In
determining what "constitutes an 'offer[]' as the term is used in §271(a)," the court looked to the
common law of the United Kingdom for guidance; the "common law of contract does not limit the
meaning of'offer for sale' in the context of patent infringement." Id. at 1251 (citing Gerber Garment
Tech. Inc. v. Lectra Sys. Ltd., 13 R.P.C. 383, 411-12 (United Kingdom Patents Court 1995)). Unlike
the United Kingdom which has "held that mere advertising activities could infringe, even if the
activities do not meet the common law definition of offer," the Federal Circuit in Rotec "define[ed] §
271(a)'s 'offer to sell' liability according to the norms of traditional contractual analysis." Id. at
1252-53. Therefore, where an advertisement "is clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open
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If an enumerated offense is alleged to have occurred in the course of
advertising activity, and the offense occurred during the policy period, then
the insurer may have a duty to defend so long as there is not a modified
endorsement or definitional change contained within the policy that clearly
1 56
excludes such coverage.
Courts should put a stop to the trend of denying insurance coverage to innocent
insureds in patent infringement actions. The advertising injury provision of Ernie
Entrepreneur's CGL policy should cover his litigation costs.

for negotiation, it constitutes an offer, acceptance of which will complete the contract." Lefkowitz v.
Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.E.2d 689, 691 (Minn. 1957). Furthermore, "[w]hether
in any individual instance a[n] . . . advertisement is an offer rather than an invitation to make an
offer depends on the legal intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances." Id.
', See P. L. Skip Singleton, Jr., Justice forAl: Innovative Techniques for IntellectualProperty
Litigation, 37 IDEA 605, 617-18 (1997).

